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Employee Representation in Economies in Transition
IRRA Session, 2:30 p.m., Friday, January 5, 1996
ASSA Conference, San Francisco, California

DISCUSSION

Christopher J. O'Leary
W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

The main conclusion of Richard Freeman and Elaine Bernard in What can unions do
in Transition Economies? is that unions should work within the constraints they face to grow
the economic pie, because there is no sense in fighting over the crumbs available now. Kim
Hester and Trevor Bain in Privatization, Unions and Employer Associations argue that unions
are not doing enough to advance the aims of high wages and favorable work conditions.
In the planned economies of central and eastern Europe, prior to the transition, all
workers were union members. Unions were controlled by the communist party, and were
granted a good slice of the economic pie by the party. This provided things like vacation
resorts and cheap food stuffs to be shared by union members. Unions did not fight over
wages or job security. Wages were set by central planners, and officially unemployment was
zero. There was no need to either organize or strike. Union strength came from political
position, not economic leverage or bargaining skill.
At the core of the pre-transition union structure were national industrial unions within
each state monopoly. Above these were confederations of unions which operated at the
national and regional levels. Union structures within enterprises were labor collectives,
production committees, and brigades. The brigades were essentially work teams; the
production committees were groups of work teams; and the labor collectives provided
management input to organize production at the enterprise level. The focus of union leaders
and work teams was to meet production quotas.
The current relative strength of state controlled versus independent unions is not clear
from any of the session papers. Table 2 in Freeman and Bernard shows union membership
density in state and private enterprises, but it does not show the shares of party controlled
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and free unions. Derek Jones (1995) provides some insight on successor unions from a
survey of union leaders in and around St. Petersburg, Russia in 1993. In that region,
communist party membership is no longer a necessary credential for union leaders, and there
is greater decentralization and democracy in unions. Present union structures still reflect the
way state owned industry was organized. Unions without party controlled precursors are
weak and rare. The economic vitality of the enterprise determines the strength of the union.
Staffing levels of national and regional union confederations have shrunk by up to 70%, in
part because of reduced union property holdings. Despite diminished union presence,
Freeman and Bernard argue for continued political participation. Unions might exploit
popular sympathies left over from recent universal membership.
On privatization and unions, Derek Jones (1995) cites Russian law which provides
that in medium and large enterprises, the labor collective, which is union leadership at the
enterprise level, has a major influence on decisions about the form of privatization. Hester
and Bain could strengthen their paper by investigating similar provisions for other countries
in the region. In the neuen bundeslandern of Germany, when a state owned monopoly is
privatized, smaller enterprises are established by insider managers who select the efficient
segments of the former monopoly and try to abandon the remaining hulk. The resulting
unemployment problem is huge, as must be the impact on union strength. What are the
successor rules for unions in the smaller efficient enterprises and in the large state remnants?
Are the same techniques for union busting which are practiced in the west, possible under
laws in the former communist states of eastern and central Europe?
Freeman and Bernard argue that now is not the time for unions to strike for wage
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gains, while Hester and Bain assert that wage bargaining skills must be developed. The high
level of general price inflation experienced in most of the transition countries means relative
price flexibility. So that even with rules like percentage wage increase ceilings or wages
fund growth linked to productivity gains, there is reason for union advocacy on wages.
Freeman and Bernard outline a noble mission for unions in the transition period.
They recommend unions monitor and influence privatization at the enterprise level, advocate
national legislation favorable to unions, and intervene with employers for individual union
members. They cite tri-partite groups as a useful mechanism for channeling input. Such
groups are well established in Hungary and Poland. In both countries national, regional, and
local employment policy is largely guided by tri-partite labor market committees.
The Political State Secretary in the Hungarian Ministry of Labor, Lajos Hethy (1995),
in a recent paper in the International Labor Review documented a great tri-partite effort in
Hungary. In the summer of 1994 the newly elected ruling coalition in parliament made up of
socialists and free democrats joined together in an effort to construct a comprehensive social
and economic agreement to cover the four years of government. The forum for deliberations
was the tri-partite National Council for Reconciliation of Interests, which includes 6 union
confederations and 9 employer organizations. While the effort ultimately failed, due largely
to austerity measures resulting from International Monetary Fund targets for the central
budget deficit, it achieved a dialogue and established a basic framework for policy formation.
From these papers we see that unions in the developing market economies of central
and eastern Europe should cooperate to grow the economic pie, while at the same time
refining bargaining skills to ensure a prominent place at the future banquet table.
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